Friday, July 29, 2016
SUPREME COURT DECISION ON SECOND AMENDMENT; MASS. SUPREME COURT EMBARRASSES ITSELF
I have been so engrossed in the upcoming presidential election and the police use of force issue that I may have missed this recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion on the Second Amendment.
A correct and common sense result. I can't believe that the highest state court in Massachusetts actually believed that the Second Amendment only protected weapons or arms that existed at the time the Amendment was adopted, or any of the other reasons given. This is ludicrous attempt at judicial reasoning. They should be embarrased It show you how anti-gun and other biases corrupt some judges, even high ranking ones and how little respect they have for precedents which they personally disagree.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JAIME CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
No. 14–10078. Decided March 21, 2016
The Court has held that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 582 (2008), and that this “Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States,” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 750 (2010). In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns after examining “whether a stun gun is the type of weapon contemplated by Congress in 1789 as being protected bythe Second Amendment.” 470 Mass. 774, 777, 26 N. E. 3d 688, 691 (2015).
The court offered three explanations to support its holding that the Second Amendment does not extend to stun guns. First, the court explained that stun guns are not protected because they “were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment.” Id., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. This is inconsistent with Heller’s clear statement that the Second Amendment “extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” 554 U. S., at 582.
The court next asked whether stun guns are “dangerous per se at common law and unusual,” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694, in an attempt to apply one “important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms,” Heller, 554 U. S., at 627; see ibid. (referring to “the historicaltradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and thatstun guns are “unusual” because they are “a thoroughlymodern invention.” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693–694. By equating “unusual” with “in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,” the court’s second explanation is the same as the first; it is inconsistent with Heller for the same reason.
Finally, the court used “a contemporary lens” and found“nothing in the record to suggest that [stun guns] arereadily adaptable to use in the military.” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694. But Heller rejected the proposition “that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” 554 U. S., at 624–625.
For these three reasons, the explanation the Massachusetts court offered for upholding the law contradicts thisCourt’s precedent. Consequently, the petition for a writ of certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent withthis opinion.It is so ordered.