OTAppeasement, current sanctions and negotiations alone will not work with Putin and Iran

If you are into the history of diplomacy and WWII you are undoubtedly familiar with the tragedy of "appeasement" which only encouraged Hitler to become more aggressive and eventually led to his invasion of Poland which led to the start of WWII in Europe.  Failure of the League of Nations to take a tough stand other concessions/acquiescence in Nazi violations of the Treaty of Versailles also added to the problem. This is obviously not the sole cause, but it was an important part of the development of the tragedy.

Although I am wary of international military involvement, like many I worry that our policies toward Russia and Iran are going to backfire. 

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is a bully. As a dictator he worries little about the effect of sanctions and can blamed the West for Russia's crumbling economy.  The Russians have violated two ceasefires and and the likely outcome is de facto Russian annexation of Eastern Ukraine.  According to the Economist:

"Look at the world from his perspective, and Mr Putin is winning. For all his enemies’ machinations, he remains the Kremlin’s undisputed master. He has a throttlehold on Ukraine, a grip this week’s brittle agreement in Minsk has not eased. Domesticating Ukraine through his routine tactics of threats and bribery was his first preference, but the invasion has had side benefits. It has demonstrated the costs of insubordination to Russians; and, since he thinks Ukraine’s government is merely a puppet of the West (the supposed will of its people being, to his ultracynical mind, merely a cover for Western intrigues), the conflict has usefully shown who is boss in Russia’s backyard. Best of all, it has sown discord among Mr Putin’s adversaries: among Europeans, and between them and America. . . the contest he insists on can no longer be dodged. It did not begin in poor Ukraine and will not end there. Prevailing will require far more resolve than Western leaders have so far mustered."

This author, like most has not stomach for direct western intervention.  He even has doubts about arming the Ukraine

"The current version of this quandary is whether, if the latest ceasefire fails, to arm Ukraine. Proponents think defensive weapons would inflict a cost on Mr Putin for fighting on. But anyone who doubts his tolerance of mass casualties should recall his war in Chechnya. If arms really are to deter him, the West must be united and ready to match his inevitable escalation with still more powerful weapons (along, eventually, with personnel to operate them). Yet the alliance is split over the idea. Mr Putin portrays the war as a Western provocation: arming Ukraine would turn that from fantasy to something like fact, while letting him expose the limits of Western unity and its lack of resolve—prizes he cherishes. If fresh Russian aggression galvanises the alliance, arming Ukraine will become a more potent threat. Until that point, it would backfire."

A better strategy is to eschew his methods and rely on an asset that he, in turn, cannot match: a way of life that people covet. If that seems wishy-washy beside his tanks, remember that the crisis began with Ukrainians’ desire to tilt towards the EU—and Mr Putin’s determination to stop them. Better ensure the cash is not misspent or stolen). The IMF deal announced on February 12th should be only a start. Mr Putin wants Ukraine to be a lesson in the perils of leaning West. It should instead be an exemplar of the rewards.

Just as urgently, those former Soviet countries that have joined Western institutions must be buttressed and reassured. If the case for sending arms to the Donbas is doubtful, that for basing NATO troops in the Baltics is overwhelming, however loudly Mr Putin squeals. Western leaders must make it clear, to him and their own people, that they will defend their allies, and the alliance—even if the struggle is covert and murky."

Further, although it is not a formal treaty, doesn't the U.S. have some obligation to the Ukraine.

"Much attention has focused on the so-called Budapest Memorandum. As part of the process to get Ukraine to give up Soviet nuclear weapons and other components it had inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a long and complicated set of negotiations took place. Some in Ukraine wanted to keep nuclear weapons as a hedge against the possibility that Russia, in the future, would use its superior power to pressure Ukraine or even reincorporate it into a new union. The government of Leonid Kravchuk was persuaded to part with the weapons, in part by promises of massive Western foreign aid, and guarantees that Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity would be protected. The Budapest Memorandum, signed in December 1994, was a promise and pledge of the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia to secure Ukraine’s borders and to protect Ukraine against attack particularly by a nuclear power.
The problem, however, is that like many other “understandings” reached during the late Cold War and early post Cold War period, this was not set up as a formal treaty. So,

This promise was an important incentive in getting Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons. However, it is not akin to the treaty which created Belgium and which guaranteed its security–the stated reason for Britain to declare war on Germany in 1914 after the German army violated the Belgian frontier. It is, as the title suggests, a memorandum. It was never ratified by the Senate and it offers no security guarantees whatsoever to Ukraine."

There are no easy answers to Putin, but the current approach is not going to work.

Next Iran.  The West has been negotiating for years with the Iranians to give up the technology and materials that can be used to build a nuclear weapon.  There has been lots of stalling and half-hearted claims of wanting to negotiate by the Iranians.  Some of the talks are in their 12th round. Sanctions do not seem to be working.  The current round of negotiations looks like it will fall through.  If some workable diplomatic solution is not found soon, will the Isreaeli's take military action.  This could result in a new explosion in the Middle East.  The Obama administrations indecision and wishy-washy approach here, as with the Ukraine, only encourages our opponents.   Again there are no easy answers, but something more needs to be done.  The Obama administration's head-in-the-sand approach, which we saw initially with ISIS, is not going to work.