SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
JAIME
CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
OF MASSACHUSETTS
No. 14–10078. Decided March 21, 2016
PER
CURIAM.
The
Court has held that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in
existence at the time of the founding,” District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U. S. 570, 582 (2008), and that this “Second Amendment right is fully
applicable to the States,” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742,
750 (2010). In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a
Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns after examining
“whether a stun gun is the type of weapon contemplated by Congress in 1789 as
being protected bythe Second Amendment.” 470 Mass. 774, 777, 26 N. E. 3d 688,
691 (2015).
The
court offered three explanations to support its holding that the Second
Amendment does not extend to stun guns. First, the court explained that stun
guns are not protected because they “were not in common use at the time of the
Second Amendment’s enactment.” Id., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. This is
inconsistent with Heller’s clear statement that the Second Amendment
“extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of
the founding.” 554 U. S., at 582.
The
court next asked whether stun guns are “dangerous per se at common law and
unusual,” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694, in an attempt to apply one
“important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms,” Heller, 554
U. S., at 627; see ibid. (referring to “the historicaltradition of
prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and thatstun guns are “unusual” because
they are “a thoroughlymodern invention.” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at
693–694. By equating “unusual” with “in common use at the time of the Second
Amendment’s enactment,” the court’s second explanation is the same as the
first; it is inconsistent with Heller for the same reason.
Finally,
the court used “a contemporary lens” and found“nothing in the record to suggest
that [stun guns] arereadily adaptable to use in the military.” 470 Mass., at
781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694. But Heller rejected the proposition “that
only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” 554 U. S., at 624–625.
For
these three reasons, the explanation the Massachusetts court offered for
upholding the law contradicts thisCourt’s precedent. Consequently, the petition
for a writ of certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent withthis opinion.
It is so ordered.
